Introduction
Cyber threats appear in different forms and present different levels of seriousness. Whereas a cyber-attack amounting to armed attack is perhaps the most serious threat emanating from cyberspace, the probability of such an attack happening is quite low. Yet, legal commentators have focused their attention almost exclusively on such attacks and discussed how the rules on the use of force found in the United Nations (UN) Charter and in customary law apply to such attacks.
1 Although low-intensity cyber operations are more frequent, the legal framework that applies to them has not been fully explored. 2 Low-intensity cyber operations refer to cyber operations amounting to a use of force below the threshold of an armed attack as well as to cyber operations below the use of force threshold. Whether low-intensity cyber operations constitute uses of force depends on the harm they cause in the sense of material damage, human injury and loss or loss of functionality.
3 This article will focus on countermeasures as acceptable responses to low level cyber operations and examine the legal framework within which countermeasures operate.
The article proceeds thus as follows. Part 2 will provide an account of the genealogy of countermeasures and explain the legal regime within which they operate. This is very important because, although the term countermeasures is a recent invention having specific legal connotations, the normative and legal history of countermeasures is quite rich and instructive. Identifying the target of countermeasures is critical not only for the effectiveness but also for the lawfulness of countermeasures, therefore Part 3 will examine the standards according to which low level cyber operations can be attributed to a State or to a non-State actor. Part 4 will explore the scope of the principle of proportionality in the context of countermeasures whereas Part 5 will examine the availability of third party countermeasures against low-intensity cyber operations and consider the legal effects of countermeasures on third parties.
Genealogy of Countermeasures
Countermeasures are unilateral and decentralised mechanisms of enforcing international law in view of the latter's weak enforcement mechanisms. 4 Their legality is premised on three factors: (i) the existence of a prior wrongful act; (ii) the inability or unwillingness of the wrong-doer to redress the situation; (iii) the proportionality of the measure. Countermeasures are the modern incarnation of reprisals which as a concept and activity has a long pedigree. 6 As it was said, reprisals "existed well before law, needless to say international law. The paradox of international law as a legal order is that it allowed reprisals into the legal system itself." 7 The locus classicus of the law of reprisals is the Naulilaa arbitration of 1928. The case concerned forcible action against Portuguese forts and posts in Angola, following the killing and wounding of German officers by Portuguese soldiers. Sudan and Afghanistan following the bombing of their embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Although they invoked self-defence, the reasoning is more akin to reprisals in that it invoked the wrongfulness of the prior use of force, the failed request for redress, the proportionality of the action and the lack of effective alternatives. 28 According to the US Ambassador to the United Nations: The same can be said with regard to the 1986 US raids in Libya in response to a terrorist attack in West Berlin which caused the killing of a US serviceman. Although the action was justified under the self-defence rubric, it is closer to reprisal even if it was disproportionate in its execution.
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Often the term defensive reprisals 31 is used to describe proportional counterforce to prior uses of force with the explanation that, whereas reprisals are punitive and retributive in character, defensive reprisals are purely defensive. It should be noted however that it is difficult to distinguish reprisals from self-defence on that basis because both reprisals and self-defence may have a retaliatory element or be defensive by preventing future attacks. 32 Although reprisals share a lot in common with self-defence, any 'normative drift' to stretch the meaning of self-defence is unnecessary.
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In the light of what was said above, it is submitted that a State can respond to low-intensity cyber operations which amount to a use of force by taking forcible reprisals. However, it
should be stressed that the use of force involved in such a cyber operation should reach a certain level significance in order to justify a reprisal action. 34 It goes without saying that the lawfulness of the countermeasure or reprisal is premised on the existence of a prior breach of an international obligation owned to the injured State. I will not enumerate here all the obligations that low-intensity cyber operations may breach, but I will only indicatively mention the obligation enshrined in the UN Charter and in customary law not to use force, the customary law obligation not to intervene in a State's affairs or the customary law obligation to respect a State's sovereignty.
If States can resort to countermeasures or reprisals in response to low-intensity cyber operations, identifying the target of their action is crucial. As the ICJ said in relation to countermeasures, they must be directed against the State that is responsible for the wrongful act. 36 This brings into the fore the issue of attribution which will be examined in the next section. one of the reprisal conditions -that there should be a breach of an international obligation -is not met. It should be recalled that, in contrast to self-defence whose legality as will be explained later is premised on a factual occurrence (an armed attack), reprisals have maintained their normative link to an antecedent illegality. Their legality in other words is premised not on a factual situation -the use of force -but on a legal one: the violation of the obligation not to use force.
Attribution in Low-intensity Cyber Operations
At this stage, it will be useful to remind ourselves of how the law of self-defence evolved in this respect. Nowadays there is increased acceptance of a State's right to take direct selfdefence action against non-State actors. 52 This is supported by the fact that the modern formulation of self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter has been normatively decoupled from the illegality of the initial action. To explain, normatively, the use of force by way of self-defence is a reaction to a prior violation of international law involving the use of force. As Ago put it "acting in self-defence means responding by force to forcible wrongful action carried out by another, and the only reason why such a response is not itself wrongful is that the action which provoked it was wrongful".
That initial violation
"is not only an extremely serious one but is also of a very special kind", 54 justifying thus forcible reaction. In the process, the unlawfulness of the prior use of force lost its significance in the legal construction of self-defence which is now premised on the existence of a prior factual situation in the form of an armed attack. International law does not provide any answer to the dilemma but any answer will be political. The only possibility that exists is for the Security Council to impose collective sanctions on non-State actors. The Security Council has such power when it determines that there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression 57 and it has imposed sanctions on non-State actors in the past. 58 Additionally, the Security Council can take enforcement action.
Proportionality in Countermeasures
Proportionality is an essential condition in the law of countermeasures as well as of reprisals. out of all proportion to the act which has motivated them". 60 It was on that basis that it opined that the German reprisals were disproportionate.
Article 51 ARSIWA is more flexible when it comes to determining the proportionality of countermeasures. According to this provision, counter measures should be "commensurate to the injury suffered and take into account the gravity of the wrongful act and the rights in Is this however correct? Proportionality is a general principle of law and therefore of international law and in broad terms implies a two prong test: first, whether the measure 60 Naulilaa Incident Arbitration, supra note 6, p. 1028. 61 These may refer to the interests protected and the seriousness of the breach. Crawford, supra note 7, p. 296, para. 6. pursues a legitimate aim and, secondly, whether the measure and the means used are excessive or unnecessary in relation to the objective being pursued.
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What is important therefore is to identify first the purpose of the countermeasure because that will be the primary referent point against which proportionality will be assessed. Article 49
ARSIWA defines the purpose of countermeasures in instrumental terms, namely, to induce a State to cease its wrongful conduct and provide reparation. If reparation is the objective of countermeasures, then the injury is the primary unit for assessing the proportionality of the countermeasure but if inducing compliance is also one of its aims, it may involve a higher amount of compulsion compared to the injury. This immediately defies the injury -response equivalence embodied in Article 51 ARSIWA. In the Air Service Agreement arbitration between the US and France, the tribunal concluded that the US countermeasures were not disproportionate even if their severity was greater compared to France's initial action. As it was observed, "the real insight of the Air Service Agreement award was that there had to be a permissible level of escalation in response to illegal acts, or else the malefactor would simply not regard the threats made by the injured state as credible".
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The ARSIWA seem to subordinate the purpose of countermeasures to the proportionality calculus when it asserts that proportionality is a limitation even on measures which may be justified under Article 49 and continues by saying that a disproportionate measure may well be judged as not being necessary to induce compliance. This view is shared by the present writer as far as countermeasures are concerned but it is also contended that a more nuanced view of proportionality is needed in the context of reprisals. Traditionally, reprisals have fulfilled many different purposes such as deterrence, protection, retribution, coercion or reparation and therefore proportionality should be assessed accordingly. 67 In this regard it should also be noted that linking the proportionality of a forcible measure to its goals is prevalent in the use of force regime. To give an example, it is widely accepted that the use of force by way of self-defence can be quantitatively larger than the initial armed attack because its aim is to repel the attack and its proportionality should be commensurate to its capacity to achieve that result. 68 The second test of the proportionality calculus concerns the suitability of the measure and of the means used to achieve the aim. Means do not necessarily need to be qualitatively similar to the initial act and therefore a State may respond to low-intensity cyber operations with cyber or physical means. That said, countermeasures should involve non-forcible measures whereas reprisals involve armed means.
There are two other issues concerning proportionality that need to be mentioned. First, in the context of low-intensity but repeated cyber operations, proportionality may be assessed against the cumulative effect of said operations. Repeated cyber operations involving the use of force may cross the threshold of an armed attack in which case the victim State can use force by way of self-defence. The proportionality of the self-defence action will then be assessed against its aim as explained above. As Ago put it, "the requirement of proportionality will certainly not mean that the victim State is not free to undertake a single armed action on a much larger scale in order to put an end to this escalating succession of attacks". 69 Yet, even if such operations do not rise to the level of an armed attack, a State may react to repeated low intensity cyber operations through a single act of reprisal or through countermeasures whose proportionality will be assessed against the cumulative effect of the prior operations as well as against the aims pursued by the reprisal or countermeasure.
Secondly, because of the fluidity of cyber operations, the lack of territorial grounding and the difficulties in identifying the authors of the attack, it has been suggested that reciprocal countermeasures are most suitable and, perhaps, more effective in the cyber context. proportionality is a wider concept than reciprocity, and it is not only about the nature of the measure. Even in the case of reprisals where action and reaction are qualitatively similar, in that they are both uses of force, the proportionality calculus takes into account other criteria as explained in this section.
Countermeasures by Third States and Countermeasures Affecting Third States
Can Such authority and control may be more difficult to establish if the countermeasure is purely cyber, although the concept of virtual control has also been introduced. 85 It has also been argued that extraterritorial jurisdiction is based on a State's positive obligation to respect human rights and its negative obligation to ensure respect of human rights. 86 The latter obligation is not territorially limited since a State can always prevent its organs or agents from violating human rights. Yet, even if individuals residing in a third State are placed under the jurisdiction of the responsible State on the grounds mentioned above, the violation of their rights will give rise to human rights litigation. Individuals cannot take countermeasures against States. It is only their State of nationality that may be able to take countermeasures in relation to such breaches if it exercises diplomatic protection in which case the wrongdoing State's duties are owned not to the individual but to her State of nationality.
Conclusion
From the preceding discussion it can be concluded that countermeasures are international law That said, it should be noted that the problems highlighted above are not peculiar to the cyber context but perhaps the cyber context exacerbates any legal uncertainty that may exist and puts more pressure on international rules and principles.
